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Epistemic Logic with Partial Dependency Operator
Xinyu Wang1[0000−0002−4811−693X]
School of Electronics Engineering and Computer Science, Peking University
Abstract. In this article, we introduce partial dependency modality D into
epistemic logic so as to reason about partial dependency relationship in
Kripke models. The resulting dependence epistemic logic possesses de-
cent expressivity and beautiful properties. Several interesting examples
are given, which illustrate this logic’s practical usage. The logic’s bisim-
ulation is then discussed, and we provide a sound and strongly complete
axiomatization for part of the language.
Keywords: Epistemic logic · Partial dependency · Independence logic.
1 Introduction
Following some previous fundamental work on “knowing value” [14,15,10,4,2],
recent years have seen an abundance of interest in this novel kind of non-
standard epistemic logic. There has been epistemic logic with functional de-
pendency operator [3], which can help us reason about knowing that the value
of certain variable is functionally decided by some other variables. For instance,
the agent knows that y = x2, so he knows that y functionally depend on x even
if without knowing the exact values of x or y.
Nevertheless, the real world is never so ideal as a simple parabola. As a
matter of fact, in a lot of practical cases, the value of a dependent variable y
is usually influenced by thousands of independent factors as x1, x2, . . . in a
quite complicated way, such that it is virtually impossible to obtain a detailed
function to precisely determine the value of y. Therefore, in both scientific and
social study, the method of control variable gets widely used. We often set the
values of all the other variables rigid, only change the value of an independent
variable x and observe the change of the dependent variable y. If the value of
y varies with the value of x, then we conclude that y partially depends on x.
In this article, we introduce modality D in order to express this kind of partial
dependency relationship.
There have also been dependence and independence logics dealing with de-
pendency relationship between variables [13,9,8,6], and we shall discuss our
logic’s connection to them in Remark 2. A similar definition for dependency re-
lationship also appears in Halpern’s recent book, pp. 14-19. [11] However, the
start point of our work is from epistemic Kripke model, and we would like to
incorporate partial dependency relationship between variables into the agent’s
knowledge, so we name it dependence epistemic logic. In our Kripke model, be-
sides a usual ∼K S5 equivalence relation representing the agent’s knowledge,
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i.e., all the possible worlds that the agent cannot distinguish, there is also a ∼G
S5 equivalence relation representing the physical probability, i.e., all the possi-
ble worlds that share the same set of physical laws with the current world. The
partial dependency relationship is valuated on the ∼G equivalence class, since
dependency relationship between variables concerns not only the current exact
world but also all the other worlds that are physically potentially possible. Read-
ers are advised to refer to examples in Section 3 so as to get an intuitive picture
on what the models of our dependence epistemic logic look like.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We lay out the basics of the
language and the semantics in Section 2. Several interesting examples are illus-
trated in Section 3. A bisimulation notion for this dependence epistemic logic
then gets thoroughly discussed in Section 4, followed by a sound and strongly
complete axiomatization for a sub-language in Section 5. We finally conclude
this paper and propose future research directions in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
Definition 1 (Language EDL). For a fixed countable set of propositions P, and a
fixed countable set of variables A, the language EDL of dependence epistemic logic
is defined recursively as:
ϕ ::= ⊤ | p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | Kϕ | Gϕ | Dg(X,Y ) | Dl(X,Y )
where p ∈ P, and X as well as Y are finite subsets of A. We define ⊥, ∨ and
→ as usual. Dg(X,Y ) reads as Y depends on X globally, while Dl(X,Y ) reads as
Y depends on X locally. In the following parts of this article, when some property
applies to both Dg and Dl, we will simply omit the subscript and write as D for
convenience, and the omitting is also similar for other notations derived from D. If
X = {x}, we will also denote D({x}, Y ) as D(x, Y ), and likely for Y if Y = {y}.
Definition 2 (Model). A dependence epistemic modelM is 〈S,U,A+, V,∼K,∼G〉:
– S is a set of possible worlds.
– U : S × P → {0, 1}.
– A+ ⊇ A is a countable set of variables.
– V : S ×A+ → N.
– ∼K is an equivalence relation over S.
– ∼G is an equivalence relation over S.
For any proposition p ∈ P, it may have its corresponding variable p ∈ A+. If
so, we then stipulate that ∀s ∈ S, V (s, p) = U(s, p). The following Subsections 3.1
and 3.3 present examples of this kind.
Definition 3 (Semantics). We define that ∀s, t ∈ S, ∀ subset X ⊆ A+, Xs = Xt
iff ∀x ∈ X,V (s, x) = V (t, x), while of course, Xs 6= Xt iff ∃x ∈ X,V (s, x) 6=
V (t, x). A pointed modelM, s is a dependence epistemic modelM with a possible
world s ∈ S.
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M, s  ⊤ ⇐⇒ always
M, s  p ⇐⇒ U(s, p) = 1
M, s  ¬ϕ ⇐⇒M, s 2 ϕ
M, s  (ϕ ∧ ψ) ⇐⇒M, s  ϕ andM, s  ψ
M, s  Kϕ ⇐⇒ ∀t ∈ S, t ∼K s,M, t  ϕ
M, s  Gϕ ⇐⇒ ∀t ∈ S, t ∼G s,M, t  ϕ
M, s  Dg(X,Y ) ⇐⇒ ∃u, v ∈ S, u ∼G v ∼G s,
(A+\(X ∪ Y ))u = (A+\(X ∪ Y ))v, Xu 6= Xv, Yu 6= Yv
M, s  Dl(X,Y ) ⇐⇒ ∃t ∈ S, t ∼G s,
(A+\(X ∪ Y ))t = (A+\(X ∪ Y ))s, Xt 6= Xs, Yt 6= Ys
Remark 1 (Expressivity ofDg andDl).We are able to perceive through Definition
3 that Dg is actually definable using ¬, G and Dl, demonstrated as the following:
Dg(X,Y )↔ ¬G¬Dl(X,Y )
In fact, Dl is strictly more expressive than Dg, which will become clear to
readers through our discussion for bisimulation in Section 4. Nevertheless, due
to Dg ’s simplicity and usefulness, we will take the language with Dg but without
Dl as a sub-language of EDL.
Definition 4 (Language EDG). For a fixed countable set of propositions P, and a
fixed countable set of variables A, the language EDG is defined recursively as:
ϕ ::= ⊤ | p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | Kϕ | Gϕ | Dg(X,Y )
where p ∈ P, and X as well as Y are finite subsets of A.
The model and semantics are the same.
Remark 2 (Connection to Independence Logic). If the total set of variables A+ is
finite and explicitly known, thenmodalityDg can be expressed in inclusion logic,
a sub-language of independence logic [5], as the following:1
Dg(X,Y ) ⇐⇒ ∃
−→
w1
−→
x1
−→
y1∃
−→
w2
−→
x2
−→
y2(
−→
w1
−→
x1
−→
y1 ⊆ (A+\(X ∪ Y ))XY ∧
−→
w2
−→
x2
−→
y2 ⊆ (A+\(X ∪ Y ))XY ∧
−→
w1 =
−→
w2 ∧ ¬
−→
x1 =
−→
x2 ∧ ¬
−→
y1 =
−→
y2)
However, this form puts too many restrictions and becomes too lengthy, while
we actually want the total set A+ to be clear from our language so that we can
reason with simple and compact logic. In fact, the team model on which inde-
pendence logic is based is quite different from the Kripke possible world model
[12], both in technique and in philosophical explanation, and hence they are
very unlike logics. While independence logic, inherited from first order logic, al-
ways reasons globally, epistemic logic, rooted from modal logic, usually reasons
locally, which is demonstrated by this obvious fact that local modality Dl can
surely not be defined in independence logic.
1 As for the notation, we prefer to use X and Y instead of −→x or −→y . Anyway, their
respective meanings in this specific context should be clear to readers.
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3 Examples
3.1 An Open Door
Let p denote that the door of the room is open now, q denote that the agent
possesses the key of the door, and r denote that the agent is able to enter the
room. Let us suppose that the agent has perfect knowledge, so ∼K relation is
only reflexive. Then we have:2
s : p, q, r
p = 1
q = 1
r = 1
G
p,¬q, r
p = 1
q = 0
r = 1
G
¬p, q, r
p = 0
q = 1
r = 1
G
¬p,¬q,¬r
p = 0
q = 0
r = 0
It is not difficult to observe that M, s  KDg(p, r) and M, s  K¬Dl(p, r).
The former says that the agent knows whether he is able to enter the room is
somewhat related to whether the door is open now – if he did not possess the
key. And the latter says that under the present situation, since the agent does
possess the key, he surely knows that if this precondition is kept unchanged,
then he was still able to open the door to enter the room even if the door was
now closed. Namely, whether he is able to enter the room does not depend on
whether the door is open now, which provides us with a fancy way to express
counterfactual assumptions.
3.2 Non-perfect Experiment
Suppose we are carrying out an experiment, and we know from theory that
there are two independent variables x and y which may influence the value of
the dependent variable z. However, due to limit of experimental methods, we
cannot control or even measure the value of y, only knowing that it will be
either 1 or 2 in every experiment.
Now we have done this experiment twice. When x = 1, z = 1. When x = 2,
z = 2. By combining all kinds of possibilities, we can have the model as:
x = 1
y = 1
z = 1
K
G
x = 1
y = 1
z = 1
K
G
x = 1
y = 2
z = 1
K
G
x = 1
y = 2
z = 1
G
x = 2
y = 1
z = 2
K
x = 2
y = 2
z = 2
K
x = 2
y = 1
z = 2
K
x = 2
y = 2
z = 2
Can we be confident that z depends on x? Certainly not, because the change
of z may be brought about by the change of y. As a matter of fact, on every
possible world s there isM, s 2 KDg(x, z).
2 When drawing all these figures in this article, for brevity we will omit some relation
lines which can be deduced from S5 equivalence class requirements.
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However, if we have further done the third experiment, and when x = 3, z =
3. Now can we be confident that z depends on x? Indeed we can. This fact can
be easily observed through the following huge model, whereM, s  KDg(x, z)
on every possible world s:
x = 1
y = 1
z = 1
G
K
x = 1
y = 1
z = 1
G
K
x = 1
y = 1
z = 1
G
K
x = 1
y = 1
z = 1
G
K
x = 1
y = 2
z = 1
G
K
x = 1
y = 2
z = 1
G
K
x = 1
y = 2
z = 1
G
K
x = 1
y = 2
z = 1
G
x = 2
y = 1
z = 2
G
K
x = 2
y = 1
z = 2
G
K
x = 2
y = 2
z = 2
G
K
x = 2
y = 2
z = 2
G
K
x = 2
y = 1
z = 2
G
K
x = 2
y = 1
z = 2
G
K
x = 2
y = 2
z = 2
G
K
x = 2
y = 2
z = 2
G
x = 3
y = 1
z = 3
K
x = 3
y = 2
z = 3
K
x = 3
y = 1
z = 3
K
x = 3
y = 2
z = 3
K
x = 3
y = 1
z = 3
K
x = 3
y = 2
z = 3
K
x = 3
y = 1
z = 3
K
x = 3
y = 2
z = 3
Whatever values y may be in the three experiments, there must be at least
two experiments in which y is the same, so we can only explain the difference
between z in these two experiments as caused by the difference between the
value of x.
3.3 Judging a Case
We have seen that global modality Dg can help us analyze complicated experi-
mental results, while local modality Dl is very helpful in expressing counterfac-
tual assumptions. And there are still trickier things worth examining. Until now,
we have only proposed examples including modality D affecting solely on sin-
gletons. It may seem by intuitive guess that D({a, b}, c) tells very similar thing as
D(a, c) ∨ D(b, c). Nevertheless, these two expressions are not exactly the same,
and in fact, they may result in quite opposite epistemic consequences, as demon-
strated by the following scenario.
Unfortunately, Charles got killed in a tragedy (c), which was related to Alan
having done something (a) and/or Bob having done something (b). Firstly, let
us suppose that either a or b could happen so as to cause c, and only one of them
could have happened to be c’s indeed cause. However, on the current world s
we are yet not sure whether a or b actually happened to be the exact cause of c.
This can be modeled as the following:
s : a,¬b, c
a = 1
b = 0
c = 1
G,K
¬a, b, c
a = 0
b = 1
c = 1
G
¬a,¬b,¬c
a = 0
b = 0
c = 0
It is not difficult to observe thatM, s  KDl({a, b}, c)∧K(Dl(a, c)∨Dl(b, c)).
This is to say, it is within our knowledge that not only the whole group event
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{a, b} is related to c, but also either a or b itself is alone related to c, namely, their
influences on c can be separated in concept. Hence, unless we obtain further
evidence to pin down our knowledge in order to determine whether Alan or
Bob was the real criminal, by presumption of innocence neither of them can be
sentenced guilty for Charles’ death.
Now let us turn to a second phenomenon, where b’s happening was a direct
consequence of a’s happening. For instance, let b denote that Bob killed Charles,
and a denote that Alan compelled Bob to kill Charles, either by threatening
that he would have killed Bob otherwise or by Alan’s mind control over Bob
through magic or science fiction. In other words, we restrict ourselves to only
consider possible worlds on which a → b holds in our Kripke model. Under this
circumstance, we can model our knowledge as the following:
s : a, b, c
a = 1
b = 1
c = 1
G
¬a, b, c
a = 0
b = 1
c = 1
G
¬a,¬b,¬c
a = 0
b = 0
c = 0
At present, even physically speaking b should be the only direct cause of
c, which is demonstrated by G(b ↔ c) holding throughout the model, to our
little surprise KDl(b, c) does not hold on the current world s. As a matter of
fact, we haveM, s  KDl({a, b}, c) ∧ K(¬Dl(a, c) ∧ ¬Dl(b, c)), a direct contrast
against the former scene. This time we not only know that c locally depends
on {a, b} as a whole, but also know that this dependency relationship should
be viewed as an entirety instead of conceptually separable, and therefore, both
Alan and Bob should be responsible for Charles’ death. Further considering that
KG(a→ b) holds on s, a legal and rational sentence ought to be that Alan is the
principal criminal while Bob is the coerced criminal, which precisely captures
the meanings of all the formulae mentioned above.
4 Bisimulation
Definition 5 (∆(u, v)). For any two possible worlds u, v ∈ S, we define:
∆(u, v) =
{
{x | x ∈ A, V (u, x) 6= V (v, x)}, if (A+\A)u = (A+\A)v
∅, otherwise
Definition 6 (Evidence). For any three sets X , Y and Z, X is called an evidence
of {Y, Z}, iff X ∩ Y 6= ∅, X ∩ Z 6= ∅, and X ⊆ Y ∪ Z.
Compared with the original semantics defined in Definition 3, we manage to
rewrite part of it in an equivalent form as the following:
Lemma 1 (Evidence Lemma I).
M, s  Dg(X,Y ) ⇐⇒ ∃u, v ∈ S, u ∼G v ∼G s,∆(u, v) is an evidence of {X,Y }
M, s  Dl(X,Y ) ⇐⇒ ∃t ∈ S, t ∼G s,∆(t, s) is an evidence of {X,Y }
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Proof. Directly from the semantics defined in Definition 3. 
Definition 7 (P(s)). For any possible world s ∈ S, we define:
Pg(s) = {nonempty finite set ∆(u, v) | u, v ∈ S, u ∼G v ∼G s}
Pl(s) = {nonempty finite set ∆(t, s) | t ∈ S, t ∼G s}
It is obvious that ∀s ∈ S, Pl(s) ⊆ Pg(s) ⊆ {nonempty finite set X | X ⊆ A}.
We again manage to rewrite part of the semantics in another equivalent form
as the following, making use of the newly defined P(s):
Lemma 2 (Evidence Lemma II).
M, s  Dg(X,Y ) ⇐⇒ ∃W ∈ Pg(s),W is an evidence of {X,Y }
M, s  Dl(X,Y ) ⇐⇒ ∃W ∈ Pl(s),W is an evidence of {X,Y }
Proof. By Lemma 1. 
Definition 8 (Generative). ∀s ∈ S, any nonempty finite set X ⊆ A is called
generative from P(s), iff for any two finite sets Y, Z ⊆ A, such thatX is an evidence
of {Y, Z}, there existsW ∈ P(s), such thatW is an evidence of {Y, Z}.
Theorem 1 (Equivalence Theorem I). For any two pointed models M, s and
M′, t, they satisfy exactly the same D(X,Y ) formulae iff:
– Zig: ∀X ∈ P(s), X is generative from P(t).
– Zag: ∀X ∈ P(t), X is generative from P(s).
Proof. For the direction from left to right, we first concentrate on the Zig con-
dition. If there exists X ∈ P(s), such that X is not generative from P(t), then
by definition, there exist two finite sets Y, Z ⊆ A, such that X is an evidence of
{Y, Z}, but there does not existW ∈ P(t), such thatW is an evidence of {Y, Z}.
By Lemma 2, this is equivalent to thatM, s  D(Y, Z) butM′, t 2 D(Y, Z). The
Zag condition follows by symmetry.
The other direction can also be verified similarly and easily. 
Definition 9 (R(s)). For any possible world s ∈ S, we define:
R(s) = {X | X is generative from P(s)}
It is obvious that ∀s ∈ S, Rl(s) ⊆ Rg(s) ⊆ {nonempty finite set X | X ⊆ A}.
Theorem 2 (Equivalence Theorem II). For any two pointed models M, s and
M′, t, they satisfy exactly the same D(X,Y ) formulae iff R(s) = R(t).
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Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 1. 
Actually, the set R(s) is the existent and the only greatest generative set
from the original P(s) while keeping satisfying the same formulae for modality
D. Therefore, it is worthwhile investigating what characteristics R(s) possesses,
since it precisely determines the modal property of the pointed modelM, s. In
the following theorem, we manage to express the generative condition for a
nonempty finite set X from P(s) in several different equivalent forms.
Theorem 3 (Generative Theorem). ∀s ∈ S, for any nonempty finite set X ⊆ A,
we define Σ(s,X) = {Y | Y ∈ P(s), Y ⊆ X}, then:
X is generative from P(s)
⇐⇒
⋃
Σ(s,X) = X, ∀Z ⊂ X such that Z 6= ∅,
∃Y ∈ Σ(s,X) such that Y ∩ Z 6= ∅ ∧ Y ∩ (X\Z) 6= ∅
⇐⇒
⋃
Σ(s,X) = X, ∀Γ ⊂ Σ(s,X) such that Γ 6= ∅,
(
⋃
Γ ) ∩ (
⋃
(Σ(s,X)\Γ )) 6= ∅
⇐⇒
⋃
Σ(s,X) = X, ∀Y1, Y2 ∈ Σ(s,X), define RY1Y2 iff Y1 ∩ Y2 6= ∅,
then ∀Y1, Y2 ∈ Σ(s,X), Y1 is connected to Y2 by a chain of R relations.
Proof. Let us concentrate on the following crucial lemma, from which the proof
of this theorem follows not difficultly. 
Lemma 3 (Generative Lemma). ∀s ∈ S, for any nonempty finite set X ⊆ A, X
is generative from P(s) iff:
– if |X | = 1, then X ∈ P(s).
– if |X | > 2, then ∀Y ⊂ X , Y 6= ∅, there exists W ∈ P(s), such that W is an
evidence of {Y,X\Y }.
Proof. The direction from left to right is immediate. For the direction from right
to left, we only have to make use of one simple fact about evidence:
– If X is an evidence of {Y, Z} and Z ⊆ Z ′, then X is an evidence of {Y, Z ′}.
which, as a matter of fact, can be correspondingly written into a sound axiom
regarding modality D:
D(X,Y )→ D(X ′, Y ), given X ⊆ X ′ (Weakening Rule)
Full axiomatization will later be discussed in the following Section 5. 
The last equivalent condition in Theorem 3 is to say, we can construct an
undirected graph over P(s) by its elements’ intersection relation, and all the
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generative sets are exactly union of some connected finite subgraph. This pro-
vides us with a clear picture and an intuitive understanding about where every
generative set comes from and what R(s) looks like. Hence given P(s), there is
an explicit algorithm to calculate all the generative Xs so as to obtain R(s).
Finally, taking into account all the modalities including K, G, Dg and Dl, we
are able to define the full bisimulation relation between two modelsM andM′:
Definition 10 (Bisimulation). A nonempty binary relation Z ⊆ S × S′ is called
a bisimulation between two modelsM andM′ iff:
– If sZs′, then ∀p ∈ P, U(s, p) = U(s′, p).
– If sZs′, then Rg(s) = Rg(s′).
– If sZs′, then Rl(s) = Rl(s′).
– Zig for K: if sZs′ and s ∼K t, then ∃t′ ∈ S′ such that tZt′ and s′ ∼K t′.
– Zig for G: if sZs′ and s ∼G t, then ∃t′ ∈ S′ such that tZt′ and s′ ∼G t′.
– Zag for K: if sZs′ and s′ ∼K t′, then ∃t ∈ S such that tZt′ and s ∼K t.
– Zag for G: if sZs′ and s′ ∼G t′, then ∃t ∈ S such that tZt′ and s ∼G t.
When Z is a bisimulation between two models M and M′, we write Z :
M↔M′. Furthermore if sZs′, we write Z : M, s↔M′, s′. If there is a bisimu-
lation Z such that Z :M, s↔M′, s′, we writeM, s↔M′, s′.
We writeM, s!M′, s′, when for any formula ϕ,M, s  ϕ iffM′, s′  ϕ.
Theorem 4 (Hennessy-Milner Theorem). For any two m-saturated models M
andM′, ∀s ∈ S, ∀s′ ∈ S′,M, s↔M′, s′ iffM, s!M′, s′.
Proof. See [1]. The definition of m-saturated models also appears as Definition
2.53 in that book. It is only the cases for modalities Dg and Dl that are added,
which just follow from Theorem 2. 
5 Axiomatization
We only provide a sound and strongly complete axiomatization for language
EDG. Nevertheless, the same as the assumed routine in this article, axioms with-
out subscripts attached to D are sound with respect to both Dg and Dl.
To start with, we may notice some obviously sound axioms to characterize
the properties of modality D:
1. D(∅, X)↔ ⊥ (Empty Set Rule)
2. D(X,Y )↔ D(Y,X) (Symmetry Rule)
3. D(X,Y )→ D(X ′, Y ), given X ⊆ X ′ (Weakening Rule)
4. D(X,Y )↔ D(X\Y, Y ) ∨ D(X ∩ Y, Y ) (Separation Rule)
Although these na¨ıve axioms indeed look very similar to those in indepen-
dence logic [7], pitifully in our dependence epistemic logic, they alone are away
from being complete. The good news is that, we can instead find some conciser
axioms, which entirely grasp the full properties of modality D itself, and from
which all the above sound axioms can surely be deduced.
For brevity, let us first define an auxiliary notation:
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Definition 11 (Q(X)). For any nonempty finite set X ⊆ A, we define:
Q(X) ::=
{
D(X,X), |X | = 1∧
Y⊂X,Y 6=∅
D(Y,X\Y ), |X | > 2
Recall Lemma 3, readers should be aware that thisQ(X) precisely depicts the
minimum necessaryD(Y, Z) formulae, such thatX is an evidence of {Y, Z}. Tak-
ing advantage of this notation, we can write down rather concise sound axioms
about modality D so as to obtain a complete axiomatization, as the following Q
and E Axioms for D in Theorem 5:
Theorem 5 (Axiomatization). The following proof system is sound and strongly
complete with respect to language EDG.
TAUT all instances of tautologies
MP from ϕ and ϕ→ ψ infer ψ
NEC for K from ϕ infer Kϕ
DIST for K K(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Kϕ→ Kψ)
T for K Kϕ→ ϕ
4 for K Kϕ→ KKϕ
5 for K ¬Kϕ→ K¬Kϕ
NEC for G from ϕ infer Gϕ
DIST for G G(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Gϕ→ Gψ)
T for G Gϕ→ ϕ
4 for G Gϕ→ GGϕ
5 for G ¬Gϕ→ G¬Gϕ
Q for D D(X,Y )↔
∨
X′⊆X,Y ′⊆Y,X′,Y ′ 6=∅
Q(X ′ ∪ Y ′), given X,Y 6= ∅
E for D D(∅, X)↔ D(X, ∅)↔ ⊥
4 for Dg Dg(X,Y )→ GDg(X,Y )
Proof. We only show completeness. The proof is almost routine, so we concen-
trate on how the canonical model is built and on the Truth Lemma for modality
Dg. Notice that the Axiom of Choice has to be made use of in the proof. 
Definition 12 (Canonical Model). For a fixed language with a set of propositions
P and a set of variables A, we first expand this language to PC and AC , such that
P
C = P, AC ⊇ A, and that AC is countably infinite. Obviously, if an MCS is
satisfied in the canonical model of the expanded language, its restriction down to
the original language will also be satisfied in the same model.
The canonical dependence epistemic modelMC is 〈SC , UC , AC , V C ,∼CK,∼
C
G 〉:
– SC is the set of all MCSs.
– UC : SC × PC → {0, 1}. ∀s ∈ SC , ∀p ∈ PC , UC(s, p) = 1 iff p ∈ s.
– ∼CK is an equivalence relation over S
C . ∀s, t ∈ SC , s ∼CK t iff {Kϕ | Kϕ ∈ s} =
{Kϕ | Kϕ ∈ t}.
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– ∼CG is an equivalence relation over S
C . ∀s, t ∈ SC , s ∼CG t iff {Gϕ | Gϕ ∈ s} =
{Gϕ | Gϕ ∈ t}.
– V C : SC × AC → N. For each fixed ∼CG equivalence class Sg ⊆ S
C , we assign
AC ’s values on every possible world s ∈ Sg as the following procedure:
By the 4 Axiom for Dg in Theorem 5, it is easy to see that if s ∼CG t, then
{Dg(X,Y ) | Dg(X,Y ) ∈ s} = {Dg(X,Y ) | Dg(X,Y ) ∈ t}. So suppose arbitrary
s ∈ Sg, Wg = {nonempty finite set X | X ⊂ A
C ,Qg(X) ∈ s} is a well defined
set, regardless of which possible world s we choose from Sg.
Claim. Wg is countable. Therefore, we can suppose a well order <W∼= ω on it.
We define a constant function f0 : A
C → N, ∀x ∈ AC , f0(x) = 0.
Lemma 4 (Canonical Assignment). For every X ∈ Wg, we can simultaneously
find two corresponding functions fX1 : A
C → N and fX2 : A
C → N such that:
– {fX1 (x) 6= f
X
2 (x) | x ∈ A
C} = X;
– if X,Y ∈ Wg, X 6= Y , then {f
X
i (x) 6= f
Y
j (x) | x ∈ A
C} is countably infinite,
i, j ∈ {1, 2};
– {fXi (x) 6= f0(x) | x ∈ A
C} is countably infinite, i ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof. Noticing that there are countably infinite variables in AC which can be
assigned to countably infinite values, whileWg is also countable and all the sets
X ∈ Wg are finite, we are sure that these requirements can be satisfied. For
example, we manage to designate fX1 and f
X
2 for every X ∈ Wg one by one,
along the well order <W . Since every X is finite, to satisfy the first requirement,
the ranges of fX1 and f
X
2 can be controlled to be both finite. For the second
requirement, if Y <W X , we let the ranges of f
X
i and f
Y
j not intersect. For the
third requirement, we let 0 not be in fXi ’s range. 
We collect all these functions as Fg = {fXi | X ∈ Wg, i ∈ {1, 2}} ∪ {f0}.
Claim. Fg is countable. Therefore, we can suppose a well order <F on it.
Then by the Well-ordering Theorem, we can also suppose a well order<S on
Sg. By correlating these two well orders <F and <S , we can use function f ∈ Fg
to assign AC ’s values on possible world s ∈ Sg, such that ∀x ∈ A
C , V C(s, x) =
f(x). As any two well orders can be compared, during this correlating procedure,
one and only one of the following three conditions will occur:
– If <F∼=<S , done.
– If we first run out of functions from Fg, then we use f0 to assign A
C ’s values
for all the other left possible worlds in Sg.
– If we first run out of possible worlds from Sg, then we arbitrarily choose
one possible world s ∈ Sg, and copy it many times so as to match all the
other left functions in Fg. All these copies of s, along with the original one,
of course share the same UC , and are in the same ∼CK and ∼
C
G equivalence
classes. Obviously, this copy will not cause any unpleasant consequences.
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Lemma 5 (Truth Lemma). ∀s ∈ SC , ∀ finite subsets X,Y ⊂ AC , Dg(X,Y ) ∈
s ⇐⇒ MC , s  Dg(X,Y ).
Proof. The cases whenX = ∅ or Y = ∅ follow immediately from the E Axiom for
D in Theorem 5, so we concentrate on the situations whenX 6= ∅ and Y 6= ∅. By
Lemma 1,MC , s  Dg(X,Y ) ⇐⇒ ∃u, v ∈ SC , u ∼CG v ∼
C
G s, such that ∆(u, v)
is an evidence of {X,Y }.
For the direction from right to left, from the above assignment procedure
of V C in the canonical model, we have Qg(∆(u, v)) ∈ s. Since ∆(u, v) is an
evidence of {X,Y }, by making use of the Weakening Rule it is not difficult to
reason that Dg(X,Y ) ∈ s.
For the direction from left to right, considering the Q Axiom forD in Theorem
5, at least one of the Qg(X ′ ∪ Y ′) in the big disjunction is in s, and thus from
the above assignment procedure of V C in the canonical model, ∃u, v ∈ SC , such
that ∆(u, v) = X ′ ∪ Y ′. Since X ′ ⊆ X,Y ′ ⊆ Y,X ′, Y ′ 6= ∅, obviously X ′ ∪ Y ′ is
just an evidence of {X,Y }. 
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this article, we come up with dependence epistemic logic in order to reason
about partial dependency relationship between variables under an epistemic
scenario. Several interesting examples are proposed, which demonstrate our
language’s affluent expressivity and practical usage. Besides that, the essential
properties of the logic are straightforward to understand, and hence we further
discuss its bisimulation relation and manage to provide a sound and strongly
complete axiomatization system for the simpler sub-language EDG.
Nevertheless, there still remains much work to be done in the future. The
axiomatization of the full language EDL is yet unknown. It will also be helpful
to elaborate on other computational properties of this logic, such as decidabil-
ity. Besides, as we only deal with the presence of a single agent in this article,
extending this dependence epistemic logic to cases with multiple agents may
result in more interesting results. Moreover, it seems to be an exciting idea to
add other modalities into this framework so that we will be able to reason about
knowing dependency, knowing value, knowing how as well as many other epis-
temic assertions all together.
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